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Introduction
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the European Union (EU) was cre-
ated in the early 1960s. During its first three decades, it was very successful, and
European agriculture produced large surplus rather than deficits by the 1980s.
This led to ever increasing market interventions in order to buy the surpluses
and to subsidize the exports. Opponents of the CAP were thus offered useful
arguments to question the budgetary and ethical consequences of the policy. In
the framework of international trade negotiations in the GATT, and later WTO,
the CAP also became unacceptable due to its increasing trade distorting charac-
ter. The combination of internal European and international criticism led to
three major CAP reforms since 19921.
The first reform in 1992 reduced the level of the intervention prices of cereals,
oilseeds and protein products, dairy products, beef, sheep and goat and tobacco.
As compensatory measure, farmers were entitled to direct payments based on
previous yields so their income was guaranteed, notwithstanding their lower
level of production2. Other mechanisms to reduce production were also intro-
duced, such as a scheme to set aside arable land3, an afforestation scheme4, an
early retirement scheme5 and an agri-environment scheme6.
A second large reform was approved in 1999, better known as the Agenda 2000
reform. The emphasis of CAP shifted further to direct income payments instead
of production-based support7. The reforms focused on the grain, beef, oilseeds
and dairy common market organisations (CMOs). Besides, a budgetary frame-
work was introduced by the Agenda 2000 reforms for the period 2000-2006,
with fixed annual expenditure ceilings8. Nonetheless, the most important
change was the introduction of a double pillar structure to finance CAP expen-
ditures. The first pillar, the Guarantee section, consisted of market measures and
direct income payments to farmers. The second pillar, the Guidance section,
focused on rural development measures9. Although the budgetary implications
of this shift were initially modest, it was an important change in the overall
1. For a detailed examination of the original regulations and of the first reforms, see DEHOUSSE,
Franklin and VINCENT, Philippe, L’éternelle Réforme de la Politique Agricole Commune et les
Limites d’Agenda 2000. In: Studia Diplomatica, Vol. LI, 5, 1998, pp. 1-132. (legal references and
bibliography included)
2. Regulation 1765/92. (OJ 1992 L181/12-20)
3. Ibid. (OJ 1992 L181/12-20)
4. Regulation 2080/92. (OJ 1992 L215/96-99)
5. Regulation 2079/92. (OJ 1992 L215/91-95)
6. Regulation 2078/92. (OJ 1992 L215/85-90)
7. Regulation 1259/1999 (OJ 1999 L160/113-118)
8. Regulation 2040/2000. (OJ 2000 L244/27-32)
9. Regulation 1258/1999. (OJ 1999 L160/105)THE NEW CONTEXT OF THE AGRICULTURAL DEBATE IN EUROPE
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orientation of CAP. A comprehensive rural development policy was designed,
which included elements such as environmentally friendly agriculture, food
safety and animal welfare10.
The CAP enters a new phase, linked to diverse evolutions. It is important to
understand them. Different elements must be taken into consideration: the last
2003 reform (§ 1), the subsequent adaptations (§ 2), the evaluations (§ 3), the
evolution of the international markets (§ 4).
Franklin DEHOUSSE & Peter TIMMERMAN11
10. Regulation 1257/1999. (OJ 1999 L 160/84-87)
11. F. Dehousse is Professor at the University of Liège and Judge at the Court of first instance of the
European Communities. Peter Timmerman is Researcher at the Egmont Institute. This comment is
a personal one and does not represent the opinions of the institutions to which they belong5
1. The 2003 Reform
The “mid-term” Review in 2003 had to address several different concerns. To
net-contributing Member States, rising expenditure related to CAP represented
a threat. On the eve of the EU-enlargement with 10 new Member States (NMS),
fears for total derailing of the CAP budget lingered. European consumers,
shocked by food crisis such as BSE or foot and mouth, expected nothing less
than products of the highest standard. Internationally, EU CAP was one of the
reasons why the Doha Round in the WTO-negotiations remained deadlocked12.
In Luxemburg, the European agricultural ministers agreed on further CAP
reforms in line with the previous reforms of 1992 and 1999 that would adapt
CAP to the concerns at hand.
1.1. Objectives and scope
As often in agriculture, the reform envisaged many objectives: a competitive
agricultural sector; production of quality products in an environmentally
friendly way; a fair standard of living and income stability for the agricultural
community; diversity in forms of agriculture, maintaining visual amenities and
supporting rural communities; simplicity in agricultural policy and the sharing
of responsibilities among the Commission and Member States; and justification
of support through the provision of services that the public expects farmers to
provide13.
In general, however, three main lines of reform can be pointed out: (1) improv-
ing the competitiveness and the market orientation of agriculture, while at the
same time avoiding a budgetary derailing; (2) enhancing rural development, so
that it can continue to provide rural public services; and (3) delivering produc-
tion of the highest quality standards with respect for environmental sustainabil-
ity, public, animal and plant health and animal welfare.
Regarding the scope of the reform, not all CMOs were included immediately as
of 2003. The reforms did apply to the following products: durum wheat, protein
crops, rice, nuts, energy crops, starch potatoes, milk, seeds, arable corps, sheep
12. LE ROY, Anne, La politique agricole commune: 20ans de transformation et d’insertion mondi-
ale., Revue de Marché commun et de l’Union européenne, No. 505, Février 2007, p. 119.
13. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Mid-Term
Review of the Common Agricultural Policy, European Commission, 10 July 2002, p. 2,
COM(2002)394.THE NEW CONTEXT OF THE AGRICULTURAL DEBATE IN EUROPE
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meat and goat meat, beef and veal and grain legumes14. Other CMOs would be
dealt with in the following years.
1.2. Principles
The 2003 reforms were based on a set of general principles: (1) decoupling, (2)
the single payment scheme, (3) cross-compliance, (4) modulation and (5) finan-
cial discipline.
1.2.1. Decoupling
Decoupling was introduced to remove the link between direct payments and
production. Prior to the reform, farmers were entitled to receive direct payments
only if they produced particular commodities. The receipt of direct payments
influenced the profitability of growing particular crops or producing particular
types of animals and thus affected farmers’ business decisions. Decoupling
income support enabled the farmers to select their business activities according
to market demand. The reform shifted CAP support from production support
to producer support15. In international trade negotiations, production-linked
subsidies were more and more seen as trade-distorting and therefore unaccept-
able. Since 2003, a limited number of exceptions per sector (‘partial decoupling’
or ‘recoupling’) were allowed if disturbance of agricultural markets or risk of
abandonment of production was feared by moving to the single payment
scheme16.
Member States also have the option to take up 10% of their total national aid
entitlement to be used for additional sectoral payments. These additional pay-
ments are taken from the direct payments to farmers and thus reduce the funds
for basic SPS payments. This so-called ‘national envelope’ should be used to
support agricultural activities that encourage the protection of the environment
or for improving the quality and marketing of agricultural products17. Although
this national envelope is clearly not meant as a way to recouple payments, its
opaque formulation leaves an opportunity to do so.
14. Regulation 1782/2003 (OJ 2003 L 270/7)
15. Ibid. (OJ 2003 L 270/4)
16. In specific, (1) up to 25% of arable area aid payments or 40% of durum wheat supplement, (2)
up to 50% of sheep and goat payments and (3) up to 100% of suckler cow premium and 40% of
slaughter premium or 100% of slaughter premium or 75% of beef special premium were allowed
to remain coupled (OJ 2003 L 270/23-24)
17. Regulation 1782/2003. (OJ 2003 OJ270/24)THE NEW CONTEXT OF THE AGRICULTURAL DEBATE IN EUROPE
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1.2.2. Single Payment Scheme
The single payment scheme (SPS), which is also referred to as single farm pay-
ment, was the instrument used to broaden the principle of decoupling. Through
SPS, farmers received a single annual payment which replaced different previous
premia. Three approaches were designed tot calculate SPS: the basic or historic
approach, the regional or flat rate approach and a mixed model. Calculations
were in each model based on the average of payments received during the refer-
ence period 2000-2002. Member States were free to choose which calculation
model to apply18.
Under the basic approach, each farmer is granted entitlements based on the indi-
vidual payments received during the reference period (reference amounts) and
the number of hectares he was farming during the reference period and which
gave right to direct payments19. In the regional or flat rate approach, the sum of
payments received by all farmers in a country or region during the reference
period constitutes the reference amounts. Thus, reference amounts are not cal-
culated at individual farmer level but at regional level. The reference amounts
are then divided by the total number of eligible hectares declared by farmers in
that region, which gives the value of 1 entitlement in that region. Finally, each
farmer receives the number of entitlements declared eligible20. This system of
calculation entails a redistributive effect at regional level21.
Member States were also left with a range of hybrid systems of calculation, such
as the possibility to combine the historic and the regional model in different
regions of their territory or a calculation partly based on the historic approach
and partly on the regional. Further variation could also be introduced between
a static or a dynamic system. In a dynamic system, there would be a transition
period to move from historic to the regional model22.
Since SPS replaces several existing premia by one single scheme, it can thus also
be seen as a technical simplification23.
18. Ibid. (OJ 2003 L 270/15)
19. Ibid. (OJ 2003 L 270/16-18)
20. Ibid. (OJ 2003 L 270/21)
21. The 2003 CAP reform: Single Payment Scheme – The concept: Information Sheets, European
Commission, p. 2, 24 January 2005. Accessed, 17 October 2007, http://bookshop.europa.eu/
eubookshop/FileCache/PUBPDF/KF6004733ENC/KF6004733ENC_002.pdf
22. Regulation 1782/2003 (OJ 2003 L 270/21-25)
23. The 2003 CAP reform: Single Payment Scheme – The concept: Information Sheets, o.c., p.1.THE NEW CONTEXT OF THE AGRICULTURAL DEBATE IN EUROPE
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1.2.3. Cross-compliance
In order to receive full direct payments, independent of being coupled or decou-
pled, a farmer will have to respect cross-compliance standards. These cross-
compliance standards are related to the environment, public, animal and plant
health and animal welfare in agricultural production and land management.
Observance of the cross-compliance standards was made compulsory. Failure to
meet the cross-compliance standards can result in deductions from, or exclusion
of direct payments. The reductions will be based on the severity, the extent, the
permanence, the repetition and the intentionality of the non-compliance24.
The system of cross-compliance is constituted out of two components: the main-
tenance of good agricultural and environmental conditions (GAEC) and the
statutory management requirements (SMRs).
Regardless if actual producing is taking place, a farmer must maintain his land
in GAEC, which relate to four issues: soil erosion, soil organic matter, soil struc-
ture and minimum level of maintenance. It was left to the Member States to
define the minimum requirements in the 4 domains designated and to ensure its
compliance25. These rules were new in 2003 and covered an area of which the
regulatory basis had been very limited until then26. The SMRs relate to 18 envi-
ronmental, public, animal and plant health and animal welfare standards that a
farmer has to comply with. The introduction of the SMRs did not create new
obligations for farmers, since the legislation in question did already exist27.
Thus, the system of cross-compliance bundled the existing legislation, facilitat-
ing its enforcement by Member States and creating more awareness among
farmers.
All Member States had to set up a system of farm audits from 2007 on, in order
to help farmers meet the cross-compliance standards. The system must advise
farmers on a voluntary basis on land and farm management processes, notably
in relation with the environment, food safety and animal welfare. Farmers
receive feedback on how standards and good practices can be applied in the
production process28.
24. Regulation 1782/2003 (OJ 2003 L 270/8-9)
25. Ibid. (OJ 2003 L270/8)
26. Evaluation de l’Impact sur l’Environnement des OCM et des mesures de soutien direct relatives
aux cultures arables, GEIE Alliance Environnement, July 2007, p. 94. Accessed, 14 December
2007, http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/eval/reports/ocm/full_text_fr.pdf
27. Regulation 1782/2003 (OJ 2003 L270/56-57)
28. Ibid. (OJ 2003 L270/10)THE NEW CONTEXT OF THE AGRICULTURAL DEBATE IN EUROPE
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1.2.4. Modulation
Modulation is the process whereby the direct payments made to farmers (pillar
1) are reduced by a certain percentage, after which the funds made available in
this way are transferred to finance rural development measures (pillar 2).
The mechanism of modulation was first introduced in the Agenda 2000 reform,
on a voluntary basis. The possibility was created for Member States to reduce
direct payments to farmers from the Guarantee section of the European Agricul-
tural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) with maximally 20% in favour
of the Guidance Section of EAGGF29. Its initial success was limited, since only
the United Kingdom applied the voluntary modulation facility since 2001 to
fund its agri-environmental scheme: the Entry Level Stewardship30.
The 2003 reform made modulation compulsory to all Member States and inten-
sified its scope. Gradually, all direct aid to farmers and market measures were
being reduced, however, direct payments up to €5,000 remained untouched for
all farmers. After a phasing in period (3% in 2005; 4% in 2006), the annual
modulation rate was set at 5% from 2007 onwards to 201231. This resulted in
€1.2 billion of extra funds for rural development measures per year in that
period32. The allocation of the money among Member States is not on a 1 for 1
basis33.
Besides the system of compulsory modulation from 2005, the option for Mem-
ber States to apply voluntary modulation was maintained as well. The maxi-
mum rate of combined compulsory and voluntary modulation was limited to
20% of the direct payments received by a farmer. From 2005 on, the funds made
available for pillar 2 by voluntary modulation were to be applied on a regional
level, a measure which was designed in order to allow the British regions Eng-
land, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales to apply different rates34.
29. Regulation 1259/1999 (OJ 1999 L160/114-115)
30. Further information: Modulation questions & answers. Department for Environment, Food
and Rural Affairs. Accessed, 10 December 2007, http://www.defra.gov.uk/farm/singlepay/further-
info/modulation.htm
31. Regulation 1782/2003. (OJ 2003 L 270/9)
32. Decision 2006/410/EC. (OJ 2006 L 163/11)
33. The allocation key takes into account the Member States’ agricultural area (weight of 65%)
and agricultural employment (35%), after adjustment in function of the relative GDP/capita in pur-
chasing power standard [Regulation 796/2004 (OJ 2004 L141/51-52)]. However, at first instance
Member States retain 1 percentage point of the total amount of modulated funds. Secondly, Mem-
ber States which received less than 80% of their modulated amount, are allocated an additional
amount to ensure that the minimal level of 80% of modulated money remains in the same Member
State. Under certain conditions, which were related to the abolition of rye intervention, a return of
90% was guaranteed [Regulation 1782/2003 (OJ 2003 L270/9)]. This applied to Germany.
34. Regulation 1655/2004 (OJ 2004 L298/3-5)THE NEW CONTEXT OF THE AGRICULTURAL DEBATE IN EUROPE
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1.2.5. Financial Discipline
A financial discipline mechanism was provided for from 2007 onwards, in order
to keep budgetary spending in check. The mechanism specifically targets market
measures and direct aids, the expenditures from pillar 1. If projections indicate
that the expenditures come within a margin of €300 million of the budgetary
ceiling, an adjustment of payments will be proposed by the Commission35.
1.2.6. Conclusion
Though modestly baptized mid-term review, the 2003 reform was essential in
more than one aspect. The single payment scheme, associated with cross-com-
pliance, was the logical conclusion of decoupling. Another fundamental aspect
was the greater autonomy given to the Member States in the framework of the
CAP. They are provided with considerable flexibility on the implementation of
the reform. The basic principles are fixed on EU level, such as the principle of
decoupling, the modulation percentages, basic cross-compliance standards and
the introduction of a financial discipline mechanism. When it comes to inform-
ing, controlling and sanctioning farmers on standards and the type of calcula-
tion for SPS, Member States take the leading role36. They can also define the
method of calculation of SPS, and some aspects of modulation.
From the financial point of view, the reform has provoked a very heavy rebal-
ancing of outlays, due to the rise of decoupled payments. This was of course
linked to the development of the WTO Doha Development Round37.
35. Ibid. (OJ 2003 L270/10)
36. Ibid. (OJ 2003 L270/8-16)
37. See GARZON, Isabelle, A changing global context in agricultural policy, in N. CHAMBON
coord., What future framework for agriculture after 2013?, Paris: Notre Europe, 2008, pp. 1-38.11
2. Subsequent Changes
2.1. The 2004 enlargement
In 2004, the accession of 10 new Member States38 (NMS) to the EU had a con-
siderable influence on European agriculture. Firstly, in the larger EU, the
number of consumers has increased by a fifth. Secondly, agriculture is still far
more economically and socially important in the NMS than in the EU-15. A few
data are revealing: the total area dedicated to agriculture reaches 22% in the
NMS, 4% in the EU-15; the share of agricultural workers in the total working
population is 13% in the NMS, 1.6% in the EU-15; the share of agriculture in
GDP is 2.8% in the NMS and 1.6% in the EU-1539.
Initially, some transitional measures were required in order to integrate the
NMS into the CAP without radical budgetary shocks for the EU-15. In general,
however, NMS applied the agricultural elements of the Community acquis from
1 May 2004. Farmers had immediate access to CAP market measures, such as
export subsidies and intervention mechanisms. However, the annual increase of
expenditure in nominal terms for market-related expenditure and direct pay-
ments (pillar 1) in the period 2007-2013 was limited to 1% per year. Direct
payments were being gradually phased in over a period of 10 years. Beginning
in 2004 at a level of 25%, direct payments were to be increased by three steps
of 5% to reach 40% of the EU level in 2007. From then on, steps of 10% were
taken so as to reach 100% in 201340.
The NMS could opt to use the standard system of direct payments (SPS) or a
simplified scheme until the end of 2008, the single area payment system (SAPS).
SAPS provided for a uniform amount per hectare of agricultural land, up to a
national ceiling resulting from the accession agreements. Agricultural land
included arable land, permanent grassland, permanent crops and kitchen gar-
dens41. SAPS was specifically designed because of its administrative simplicity,
so it would later on be easier to switch to the SPS. Both SPS and SAPS are built
on the base principle of decoupling.
38. Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and
Slovenia.
39. Report on the integration of the new Member States into the CAP, European Parliament, Com-
mittee on Agriculture and Rural Development, 1 March 2007, p. 12. (PE 378.713v02-00)
40. Presidency Conclusions. Brussels European Council of 24 and 25 October 2002. Council of the
European Union, Brussels, 26 November 2002, p. 5. (14702/02)
41. Decision 2004/281/EC (OJ 2004 L93/7)THE NEW CONTEXT OF THE AGRICULTURAL DEBATE IN EUROPE
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The NMS were given the possibility to complement or top-up the direct pay-
ments in two ways. Either a maximum complement of 30%, funded by national
resources42, or, in the first three years, by shifting up to 20% of rural develop-
ment funds to direct payments43. Direct payments could maximally be comple-
mented up to a level that is 10% higher than the level applied before accession.
For the purpose of stimulating the cultivation of energy crops and because
Member States applying to SAPS were not entitled to the energy crops scheme,
complementary national direct payments for energy crops were allowed if
approved by the Commission. The total amount of direct payments of a farmer
was never to exceed the level applied in the EU-1544.
The system of cross-compliance was only partially mandatory for Member
States under SAPS. Only the condition of good agricultural and environmental
condition applies. For those NMS that chose to use SPS, cross-compliance
applied fully45. Modulation and the financial discipline mechanism did not
apply until the NMS were phased in completely.
A framework for Community support for sustainable agriculture and rural
development for NMS had been set up in 1999, several years prior to accession.
The Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development (Sap-
ard) had to facilitate the implementation of the Community acquis46. From
2004 on, NMS were entitled to all existing measures concerning rural develop-
ment. On top of that, another transitional rural development regime was set up
for the period 2004-2006: the Temporary Rural Development Instrument
(TRDI). Funded by the Guarantee section of EAGGF47, TRDI supported the
following specific rural development measures: farms undergoing restructuring,
establishing producer groups, compliance with Community standards, technical
assistance and complements to direct payments. Additionally, NMS could also
benefit ‘Leader +’-type measures, which support local partnership initiatives48
and were funded by the Guidance section of EAGGF49.
42. Ibid. (OJ 2004 L93/9)
43. Ibid. (OJ 2004 L93/6)
44. Ibid. (OJ 2004 L93/9)
45. Ibid. (OJ 2004 L93/7)
46. Regulation 1268/1999. (OJ 1999 L161/89)
47. Regulation 27/2004. (OJ 2004 L5/36-38)
48. Act concerning the conditions of accession of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the
Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic Hungary, the
Republic of Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia and the Social Republic and
the adjustments to the Treaties on which the European Union is founded. (OJ 2003 L236/365-367)
49. Regulation 583/2004. (OJ 2004 L91/2)THE NEW CONTEXT OF THE AGRICULTURAL DEBATE IN EUROPE
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2.2. Consecutive reforms
The 2003 reforms were followed by a cycle of CMO reforms along the same
basic principles. In 2004 the Agricultural Council agreed to reform the olive oil,
cotton, tobacco and hop sectors50.
The Agricultural Council agreed on a reform of the CMO for sugar in 2005. It
introduced substantial cuts in reference prices (up to 36% in 4 years) and cuts
in minimum prices of sugar beet. The loss of income was compensated for by a
decoupled direct payment and sugar beet grown for non-food purposes was
entitled to set-aside payments and payments for energy crops. Special arrange-
ments were made for countries that enjoyed special trade agreements with the
EU51. A special 4-year transitional restructuring scheme was set up to encourage
producers to close shop52.
An agreement on the reform of the CMO in bananas was reached in 200653 and
on the CMO in fruit and vegetables in 200754. Currently a proposal of reform
for the CMO for wine55 and cotton56 is circulating. A previous reform of the
CMO of cotton in 2004 was annulled by the European Court of Justice in 2006,
because the Court concluded that infringement of the proportionality principle
had occurred57.
The financing instruments of CAP have also been reformed. The European Agri-
cultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF), created in 1962, was from
2007 onwards replaced by two funds: the European Agricultural Guarantee
Fund (EAGF) and the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development
(EAFRD).
The EAGF was designed to replace the Guarantee section of the former EAGGF.
EAGF finances expenditures such as export subsidies, intervention measures,
direct payments and certain informational and promotional measures. These
expenditures are mostly related to first pillar measures and are jointly managed
50. Regulation 864/2004. (OJ 2004 L161/48-96)
51. Regulation 318/2006. (OJ 2006 L58/4-17)
52. Regulation 320/2006. (OJ 2006 L58/42-50)
53. Regulation 2013/2006. (OJ 2006 L384/13-19)
54. Regulation 1580/2007. (OJ 2007 L350/1-98)
55. Proposal for a Council Regulation on the common organisation of the market in wine and
amending certain regulations, European Commission, 4 July 2007, 96 p. COM(2007)372.
56. Proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003 establishing com-
mon rules for direct support schemes under the common agricultural policy and establishing cer-
tain support schemes for farmers, as regards the support scheme for cotton, European
Commission, 9 November 2007, 14 p. COM(2007)701.
57. Judgement of the Court (Second Chamber), 7 September 2006, Case C-310/04.THE NEW CONTEXT OF THE AGRICULTURAL DEBATE IN EUROPE
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by the Commission and the Member States. Besides, expenditures concerning
specific veterinary measures and inspections, promotion, farm accounting infor-
mation systems and farm survey systems will be managed centrally by the Com-
mission58.
The EAFRD is replacing the former Guidance section of the EAGGF and will
serve to finance measures related to the Rural Development Policy. As a way of
achieving the Community objectives set in the Rural Development Policy and in
order to guarantee a balanced global approach between Member States, a min-
imal contribution for each of the 4 axis is required in each Member State (10%
for axis 1 and 3; 25% for axis 2; 5% for Leader)59. The expenditure will be
jointly managed by the Commission and the Member States60.
Rural development measures require co-financing by the Member States on top
of the Community funds provided through EAFRD. The EAFRD contributes
minimally 20% and maximally 50% for axis 1 and 3 or 55% for axis 2 and
Leader axis. For areas eligible under the Convergence Objective (regions whose
GDP per capita is less than 75% of the EU average), respective EAFRD contri-
bution can even amount up to 75 or 80%61. Portugal will not be subject to the
national co-financing requirement62.
2.3. The new agreement on the financial 
perspectives
Traditionally, the lion’s share of European budget is spent on CAP. Since the end
of the 1970s, the share of CAP expenditures in the total budget has decreased
significantly from over 75% to some 45% in 200663. In 2006 an Interinstitu-
tional Agreement fixed the budgetary amounts per domain in a multiannual
financial framework for the period 2007-2013.
It was difficult to come to a multiannual financial framework acceptable to all
institutions. During the compromising process, the Commission’s initial pro-
posal was slashed from €1,025 billion to €864 billion. Paradoxically, the prin-
58. Regulation 1290/2005 (OJ 2005 L209/6)
59. Regulation 1698/2005 (OJ 2005 L277/13); For more details on the 4 axis, see: 2.4 Rural
Development Policy.
60. Regulation 1290/2005 (OJ 2005 L209/7)
61. Regulation 1698/2005 (OJ 2005 L277/28)
62. Regulation 1944/2006 (OJ 2006 L367/24)
63. RUDLOFF, Bettina, New budget priorities for the Common Agricultural Policy, In: EU Moni-
tor 40, Deutsche Bank Research, 30 November 2006, p. 1. Accessed, 30 October 2007, http://
www.dbresearch.com/PROD/DBR_INTERNET_EN-PROD/PROD0000000000204375.pdfTHE NEW CONTEXT OF THE AGRICULTURAL DEBATE IN EUROPE
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cipal victims were two of the EU’s priorities. The “economic competitiveness”
policy was reduced by €60 billion despite the importance attached to the Lisbon
Strategy and the Cohesion Policy was reduced by €30 billion notwithstanding
the accession of 12 NMS since 2004.
At the same time, the CAP budget was left fairly untouched. The compromise
did reduce the heading of ‘Preservation and Management of National
Resources’ with €27 billion, totalling €371 billion for the period 2007-2013.
However, the clarification on how much of this budget is to be allocated to pillar
1 measures (market related expenditure and direct payments in agriculture)
revealed that only €8 billion had been deleted from the original proposal, leav-
ing the budget for pillar 1 at €293 billion. The agricultural budget was only so
minimally affected, because the Member States had agreed back in 2002 on a
ceiling for CAP expenditures and no consensus existed to change this agreement
again in light of the financial framework. The 2002 compromise stated that the
budget could grow maximally by 1% per year in nominal terms in the period
2007-2013 compared to 200664.
Agriculture and rural development, along with environment, resorted under a
new heading: ‘Preservation and Management of National Resources’. The
annual breakdown of the budget for ‘Preservation and Management of National
Resources’ reveals that it is going to decrease gradually from about €55 billion
per year to slightly over €51 billion. Four fifths of this budget (€43 billion in
2007 decreasing to €41 billion in 2013) was earmarked for first pillar expendi-
tures: market measures and direct payments65. However, compulsory modula-
tion was not yet calculated and would thus further reduce the share of first pillar
expenditure66.
Concerning the second pillar of rural development, the allocations for EAFRD
amounted in total to €88.3 billion during the period 2007-2013, resulting in an
annual average of about €12.5 billion for pillar 2 measures67. The total amount
of €88.3 billion is composed of 3 separate parts: (1) transfers from the EAGF
to EAFRD worth €41.2 billion68 and (2) an additional €27.7 billion which is
transferred to EAFRD from the regional component of the Convergence Objec-
64. Presidency Conclusions. Brussels European Council of 24 and 25 October 2002, o.c., p. 5.
(14702/02)
65. Interinstitutional Agreement between the European Parliament, the Council and the Commis-
sion on budgetary discipline and sound financial management. (OJ 2006 C139/10)
66. Final Comprehensive Proposal on the Financial Perspectives 2007-2013 from the Presidency.
Council of the European Union, Brussels, 19 December 2005, p. 23. (15915/05)
67. Decision 2007/383/EC (OJ 2007 L142/21-22)
68. Final Comprehensive Proposal on the Financial Perspectives 2007-2013 from the Presidency,
o.c., p. 24. (15915/05)THE NEW CONTEXT OF THE AGRICULTURAL DEBATE IN EUROPE
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tive of the Cohesion Policy69. (3) On top of that, €18.5 billion is added resulting
from modulation and other agreed transfers, such as in the CMO of cotton and
tobacco.
These numbers reveal that first pillar measures still constitute the largest share
of CAP expenditures, despite the rhetorical support for rural development poli-
cies70. On the one hand, the relative importance of the second pillar in relation
to the first pillar of CAP has increased significantly when comparing the finan-
cial frameworks of 2000-2006 and 2007-2013. For the period 2000-2006, sec-
ond pillar budget was 11.4% of that for the first pillar71, while in next 7 years,
the budget for rural development measures amounted to 23.5% compared to
the first pillar budget72. On the other hand, the total budget for rural develop-
ment, including the financing part from EU Structural Funds, in relation to the
overall EU budget did not show a similar evolution in the period 2000-2006.
Instead, its share remained constant at about 10% of the global EU budget73.
This was a consequence of the 2002 decision to limit further expansion of CAP
budget by 1% nominally per year and the budgetary cuts made to reach a com-
promise on the multiannual framework.
A closer look on the first pillar expenditures shows that market related measures
and direct payments still constitute the lion’s share of CAP expenditures in
2007, but there was a further shift in its composition compared to 2006. Direct
payments still expanded, while CAP was moving further away from the more
trade distorting interventions in the agricultural markets. Comparison shows
that the budget for interventions was reduced from €8.1 to 5.6 billion. Espe-
cially the reform of the sugar sector created a substantial change, reducing inter-
ventionist measures by a factor 4 (€1.4 to 0.3 billion). As interventionist meas-
ures were scaled back further, direct aids were scaled up from €34.1 to 36.9
billion. Especially the decoupled direct aids under SPS and SAPS were increased.
They doubled in comparison to 2006 to reach over €30 billion74.
Regarding the financing of the second pillar of CAP, it is important to know that
the EU Structural Policies contribute to rural development policy as well. This
69. Decision 2006/493/EC (OJ 2006 L195/22-23)
70. Decision 2006/144/EC (OJ 2006 L55/21)
71. Own Calculations based on the Interinstitutional Agreement of 6 May 1999 between the Euro-
pean Parliament, the Council and the Commission on budgetary discipline and improvement of the
budgetary procedure. (OJ 1999 C172/12)
72. Own Calculations based on the Interinstitutional Agreement between the European Parlia-
ment, the Council and the Commission on budgetary discipline and sound financial management.
(OJ 2006 C139/10) and Decision 2006/493/EC (OJ 2006 L195/22-23)
73. Own Calculations based on the annual EU budget during the period 2000 and 2007.
74. Final Adoption of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2007. (OJ
2007 L77 II/279, 290, 323)THE NEW CONTEXT OF THE AGRICULTURAL DEBATE IN EUROPE
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is a result of the historic evolution of the rural development policy. Support for
rural areas is based in the Single European Act of 1986, which states that “the
Community shall aim at reducing disparities between the levels of development
of the various regions”75. So clearly, European rural development policy does
not have its roots in CAP. However, the linkage between both is evident.
In the framework of the Cohesion Policy, 3 Community objectives have been set:
(1) promoting the development and structural adjustment of regions whose
development is lagging behind, (2) supporting the economic and social conver-
sion of areas facing structural difficulties and (3) supporting the adaptation and
modernisation of policies and systems of education, training and employment76.
These objectives were commonly referred to as ‘Objective 1, 2 or 3’. In practice,
this meant that Community Cohesion funding was available for rural develop-
ment projects through Structural Funds such as the European Social Fund, the
European Regional Development Fund and the Guidance Section of EAGGF.
Since the creation of a two-pillar structure for CAP in 2000, rural development
is a formal element of CAP. However, part of the funding source remained the
Structural Funds.
Under the new budgetary headings, ‘Cohesion for Growth and Employment’
now resorts under the heading of ‘Sustainable Growth’. The former ‘Objectives
1, 2 and 3’ were replaced by ‘Convergence’, ‘Regional Competitiveness’ and
‘Employment and Territorial Cooperation’. The ‘Convergence’ objective, which
is similar to ‘Objective 1’ as it is “aimed at speeding up the convergence of the
least-developed Member States and regions by improving conditions for growth
and employment”77, is used to contribute to EAFRD78.
Also in 2007 EAFRD became the single financing mechanism for rural develop-
ment measures, replacing previous contributing Funds. Financing of EAFRD is
based on three parts: (1) a part directly out of EAGF, (2) a part from the Conver-
gence Objective of the Cohesion Policy and (3) a part resulting from modulation.
In 2006, Structural Funds contributed for €3.8 billion to Agriculture and Rural
Development under Objective 1. Additionally, €0.4 billion was attributed to
Agriculture and Rural Development under Community Initiatives79. This refers
75. See article 130a of the Single European Act (OJ 1987 L169/9)
76. Regulation 1260/1999. (OJ 1999 L161/7)
77. Regulation 1083/2006. (OJ 2006 L210/25-78)
78. Regulation 1698/2006 (OJ 2006 L277/28)
79. General Budget of the European Union for the financial year 2006. The Figures, European
Commission, January 2006, p. 13. SEC(2006)50.THE NEW CONTEXT OF THE AGRICULTURAL DEBATE IN EUROPE
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to the funding of the Leader+ Initiative, which is designed to help rural actors
create a sustainable development strategy.
2.4. Rural Development Policy
The Agricultural Council adopted in 2005 and 2006 a set of objectives, general
rules and a financial framework for the EU Rural Development Policy. This
reflected the growing importance of rural development and the gradual shift
from pillar 1 to pillar 2 support measures as described above. Rural develop-
ment entered CAP in the 1970s, when less favoured areas where eligible for
special measures. In the 1992 reform, agri-environmental measures and early
retirement schemes where introduced. The Agenda 2000 reforms institutional-
ised rural development as the second pillar of CAP80 and designed a list of policy
measures for rural development81.
The EU Rural Development Policy has six strategic guidelines: (1) supporting
restructuring to improve competitiveness of agriculture and forestry, (2) improv-
ing the environment and the countryside by supporting land management, (3)
improving the quality of life and encouraging diversification of economic activ-
ities, (4) building local capacity for employment and diversification, (5) ensuring
consistency in programming and (6) complementarity between Community
instruments 82.
The first three are also the thematic issues, or so-called axis, to deal with
through a variation of measures. These are complemented by a horizontal axis,
the Leader axis, which is a local development strategy working with local actors
to support cooperation projects. It is important to note that the Leader
approach distinguishes itself from other rural development measures because it
is multisectoral rather than concentrated on agriculture alone. Through a bot-
tom-up holistic approach, farm and non-farm investments are combined to
develop the most promising sectors in an area83.
Member States have a large flexibility for the implementation of the Rural
Development Policy. The framework and general objectives are delivered by the
Community, but Member States are free to choose what policy measures they
80. Regulation 1258/1999. (OJ 1999 L160/105)
81. Regulation 1257/1999. (OJ 1999 L160/85-94)
82. Decision 2006/144/EC. (OJ 2006 L55/24-28)
83. ESPON Project 2.1.3, The Territorial Impact of CAP and Rural Development Policy. Luxem-
burg, ESPON, August 2004, pp. 180-185. Accessed, 14 December 2007, http://www.espon.eu/
mmp/online/website/content/projects/243/277/index_EN.htmlTHE NEW CONTEXT OF THE AGRICULTURAL DEBATE IN EUROPE
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believe will result in the highest added value. The different national strategy
plans have to be evaluated by the Commission to ensure its consistency with the
Community objectives84. On the other hand, Member States have to finance the
rural development measures to a certain extent themselves. How much the EU
co-finances depends on the measure and the region concerned. In 2005, agree-
ment was reached on the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development
(EAFRD), which provided a new financing framework set to enter into force in
200785.
The extension of the facility for voluntary modulation provoked conflicts
between the Council and the European Parliament86. The Council unanimously
adopted the proposed extension of it87 in its December 2005 agreement on the
financial framework 2007-201388. The Member States must meet one of the
two following criteria in order to be allowed to apply voluntary modulation: (1)
the member state already applied voluntary modulation or (2) the member state
was exempt from co-financing rural development measures89. In practice, this
means that from 2007, only the United Kingdom (first criterion) and Portugal
(second criterion90) have been able to apply voluntary modulation. The regula-
tion also states explicitly that the net amount resulting from voluntary modula-
tion is retained by the member state and that regional differentiation is possible,
two points unmentioned of in the first proposal. The maximal aggregated level
of compulsory and voluntary modulation remains 20%91.
84. Regulation 1698/2005. (OJ 2005 L277/13)
85. Regulation 1290/2005 (OJ 2005 L209/6)
86. In the legislative procedure, European Parliament clashed with the Commission on the pro-
posed regulation. The Parliament rejected the proposal twice and although it only had a consulta-
tive voice, it managed to get the proposal adopted in a way favourable to its concerns. The
Parliament disfavoured the proposal amongst others because of “the danger of discrimination
against farmers within the EU” and because of the “re-nationalisation of agricultural policy
through the back door”. See GOEPEL Lutz, Second Report on the proposal for a Council regula-
tion laying down rules for voluntary modulation of direct payments provided for in Regulation
(EC) No 1782/2003 establishing common rules for direct support schemes under the common agri-
cultural policy and establishing certain support schemes for farmers, and amending Regulation
(EC) No 1290/2005, Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development, 26 January 2007, p.6.
(A6 0009/2007).
87. Final Comprehensive Proposal on the Financial Perspectives 2007-2013 from the Presidency,
o.c, p. 23. (15915/05)
88. Presidency Conclusions. Brussels European Council of 15 and 16 December 2005. Council of
the European Union, Brussels, 30 January 2006, p. 2. (15914/1/05)
89. Regulation 378/2007 (OJ 2007 L95/2)
90. Regulation 1944/2006 (OJ 2006 L367/24)
91. Regulation 378/2007 (OJ 2007 L95/2-3)THE NEW CONTEXT OF THE AGRICULTURAL DEBATE IN EUROPE
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2.5. The simplification of the CAP
In 2005, the Commission initiated a process to simplify the CAP. This simplifi-
cation is designed as a technical rather than a political adaptation of CAP. The
revision of CAP regulations fits in the broader policy aim of the Commission to
produce better regulation, or more straightforward, to cut red tape. The Com-
mission has proposed: (1) to streamline the agricultural legislation, (2) to create
a single CMO for agricultural products replacing the existing 21 CMOs and (3)
to test the feasibility of an ‘EU net administrative cost method’ to level down the
administrative cost on farmers and (4) to reduce the 7 state aid regulations to 3:
the exemption regulation, one set of guidelines and the de minimis regulation92.
In 2007 the Council backed the Commission’s proposal to introduce a single
CMO for agricultural products replacing the existing 21 existing CMOs93. The
single CMO increases transparency and is a technical simplification, as it
replaces over 650 legal articles in the current regulations with around 20094.
At the same moment, the Council of Agricultural Ministers backed the Commis-
sion’s report and its ensuing proposals on simplification of the cross-compliance
system95. The Commission’s analysis of the system of cross-compliance stand-
ards found several shortcomings. The principal issues raised by the Member
States, who have a large discretion in the implementation, were:
• in general, the system was felt as burdensome,
• the volume and technical nature of information hampered awareness-raising
among farmers,
• control rates were not always met because the population subject to controls
was known to late,
• the existence of inarticulate rules concerning on-the-spot checks and report-
ing,
• the calculation of reductions was difficult and some notions (e.g. “intention-
ality”) were hard to define, leaving possible discrepancies between Member
States96.
92. Communication from the Commission on Simplification and Better Regulation for the Com-
mon Agricultural Policy, European Commission, 19 October 2005, pp. 8-9, COM(2005)509.
93. Regulation 1234/2007 (OJ 2007 L299/1-149)
94. Simplifying the Common Agricultural Policy: Council backs ‘single Common Market Organi-
sation’, European Commission, 11 June 2007. (IP-07-795)
95. Council supports Commission move to improve Cross Compliance system, European Commis-
sion, 11 June 2007. (IP/07/796)
96. Report from the Commission to the Council on the application of the system of cross-compli-
ance, European Commission, 29 March 2007, pp. 4-5. COM(2007)147.THE NEW CONTEXT OF THE AGRICULTURAL DEBATE IN EUROPE
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The major proposed adaptations outlined in the report were:
• Member States should be allowed to tolerate minor cases of non-compliance
and reductions below a minimal threshold (?50) should not be applied.
However, a warning letter should still be sent and follow-up ensured.
• Introduction of a single control rate of 1% minimum of on-the-spot checks.
• If notice has to be given of on-the-spot checks, this needs to happen 14 days
in advance. Only half of the land parcels need to be subjected to control. The
farmer must receive the control report within 3 months after the check.
• A simplification of ‘10-month rule’, which obliges the farmer to keep at his
disposal for 10 months any land parcels declared to activate entitlements to
SPS.
• A phasing-in period of 3 years for NMS applying to SAPS, for whom the
SMRs will come into force from 2009 onwards97.
By the end of 2007, the Commission adopted a new regulation including some
of these proposals to improve the cross-compliance system98.
2.6. The 2007 enlargement
In 2007, Bulgaria and Romania acceded to the EU. In both countries, the impact
of agriculture on the national economy was far more significant than in the EU-
25. The Bulgarian agriculture accounted for 7.2% of the GDP in 2005, com-
pared to 1.3% in the EU-25. Employment in agriculture corresponded to 9.3%
of the total employment, whereas this was 5.0% in the EU-2599. The Romanian
situation was similar, with agriculture accounting for 8% of the GDP and
32.8% of the national employment in 2005100.
The Accession Treaty of Bulgaria and Romania provided for similar transitional
measures as given to the 10 NMS in 2004. Specifically, direct payments were
also going to be phased in gradually over a period of 10 years, with potential
top-ups paid from national resources or from rural development funds in order
to compensate the temporarily lower levels of direct support. Both countries
could opt to apply SAPS instead of SPS, with a less stringent cross-compliance
system attached to it. Regarding rural development, a number of specific addi-
97. Ibid., pp. 6-9.
98. Regulation 1550/2007 (OJ 2007 L337/79-84)
99. Background Note Bulgaria, European Commission, DG for Agriculture and Rural Develop-
ment. Accessed, 28 March 2008, http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/publi/ms_factsheets/2007/
bulgaria_en.pdf
100. Background Note Romania, European Commission, DG for Agriculture and Rural Develop-
ment. Accessed, 28 March 2008, http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/publi/ms_factsheets/2007/
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tional support measures were designed for farm restructuring, early retirement,
investments and ‘Leader +’-type measures. Besides these provisions, Bulgaria
agreed specific transitional measures concerning milk and veterinary and phy-
tosanitary legislation. Romania obtained similar concessions regarding wine
and veterinary and phytosanitary legislation101.
101. Documents concerning the accession of the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania to the Euro-
pean Union. (OJ 2005 L157/3-395)23
3. The Evaluations
After a few years, a lot of reports have been published about the implementation
of the 2003 reform. They are important to understand some propositions of
revision presently discussed.
3.1. The situation in the new Member States
An evaluation by the Commission of the situation in the NMS 1 year after
enlargement concluded that enlargement had a generally positive effect on their
agricultural sector. Farm income had increased by 56% in nominal terms in
2004 due to improved prices and EU direct payments. Land prices increased
only modestly, consumer prices generally increased102.
In 2006, the Committee on Agriculture and Development of the European Par-
liament issued a report on the integration of NMS in CAP. In general, its con-
clusions were in line with the Commission’s findings. The Committee stated that
the integration was a success, resulting in a win-win situation for both old and
new Member States. The functioning of the single market was not disrupted in
the integrating process, nor were there any problems relating to food safety103.
Nonetheless, the report was also critical on some issues. The main critique con-
cerns the possibility for NMS to complement national direct payments. Because
this cofunding would have led to strains on the national budget, most Member
States opted for so-called negative modulation, which regroups rural develop-
ment funds to pay for the top-ups. This negative modulation turns one of the
basic ideas of the CAP reform completely upside down104. More generally,
national cofunding is seen by some as re-nationalisation of agricultural poli-
cies105. Furthermore, since CAP expenses are based on European objectives,
regardless of which Member States is to benefit from it, cofunding is contradic-
tory to the general concept of financial solidarity between Member States as
stated in the Treaty106.
102. Prospects for Agricultural Markets and Income 2005-2012, European Commission, July
2005, pp.24-25. Accessed, 31 October 2007, http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/publi/caprep/
prospects2005/fullrep.pdf
103. Report on the integration of the new Member States into the CAP, o.c., p. 13.
104. Ibid., p. 14.
105. LE ROY, o.c., p. 121.
106. “The Community shall have as its task […] by implementing common policies or activities
[…] to promote throughout the Community […] economic and social cohesion and solidarity
among Member States.” See article 2 of the Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European
Union and of the Treaty Establishing the European Union Community. (OJ 2006 C321/44)THE NEW CONTEXT OF THE AGRICULTURAL DEBATE IN EUROPE
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The lower level of direct payments in NMS during the phasing in period was
also criticized for hindering the necessary adaptation and created unequal con-
ditions for competition on the internal market107. The report criticized also the
system’s complexity. The rural development programme, as well as its predeces-
sor Sapard, were not able to realise the goals set, due to administrative complex-
ity and limited Community funding108. ‘Production for subsidies’ was noted in
the NMS as well, notwithstanding the decoupled nature of payments. Some
Member States reportedly were of the opinion that coupled payments have to
remain possible until 2013 in order to reach more balanced development and
long-term sustainability. This does not confirm the concept of decoupling, as
promoted by the Commission109.
3.2. Direct payments
Concerning the implementation of the direct payments under the CAP reform,
two general trends can be distinguished.
Firstly, a majority of the former EU-15110 established the SPS on a historical
basis111. Despite decoupling of support, this calculation method is still linked to
previous production levels (minimum €5,000) and therefore not fully represent-
ative of the spirit embedded in the CAP reforms112. Secondly, all but two
NMS113 decided to implement SAPS rather than immediately introduce SPS114.
According to the parliamentary report quoted above, this was due to the com-
plexity of SPS. At the end of 2006, the Council approved an extension of SAPS
until the end of 2010115. The facility of national envelopes was partially or for
the full 10% applied in 8 Member States116.
A 2008 report on the added value of CAP expenditure has been critical on the
system of direct payments, despite the general acknowledgement that the 2003
107. Report on the integration of the new Member States into the CAP, o.c., p. 7.
108. Ibid., p. 15.
109. Ibid., p. 16-17.
110. Austria, Belgium, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the Brit-
ish regions Scotland and Wales.
111. Overview of the Implementation of Direct Payments under the CAP in Member States, Euro-
pean Commission, January 2008, Accessed 2 April 2008, http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/markets/
sfp/pdf/2008_01_dp_capFVrev.pdf
112. DOORNBOSCH, Richard, STEENBLIK, Ronald, Biofuels: Is the cure worse than the dis-
ease? Round Table on Sustainable Development, OECD, Paris, 11-12 September 2007, p. 44.
Accessed, 18 October 2007, http://www.foeeurope.org/publications/2007/OECD_Biofuels_Cure_
Worse_Than_Disease_Sept07.pdf
113. Slovenia and Malta.
114. Overview of the implementation of direct payments under the CAP in Member States, o.c.
115. Regulation 2012/2006. (OJ 2006 L384/11)
116. Overview of the implementation of direct payments under the CAP in Member States, o.c.THE NEW CONTEXT OF THE AGRICULTURAL DEBATE IN EUROPE
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reforms removed considerable irregularities and the direct payments in particu-
lar were a large improvement to price support. Direct payments were found
inefficient in targeting their objectives, such as providing income support or
encouraging environmentally friendly farming practices. The argument of pro-
viding income support does not make sense, because the direct payments are not
based on an analysis of the individual needs of farmers and thus fail in targeting
low-incomes farmers. Instead, direct payments are still linked to yields per hec-
tare during an earlier period. Similarly, the amount of direct payments had no
relation to the real costs for cross-compliance measures117.
3.3. Cross-compliance
The Commission issued a report on the application of the system of cross-com-
pliance in 2007. The report, based on data provided by 23 Member States for
2005, stated that 4.92% of farmers affected by cross-compliance obligations
received on-the-spot checks or a total of 240,898 checks was executed. These
resulted in reductions of direct payments, amounting to €9.84 million, for
11.9% of farmers controlled118.
3.4. Administrative burden of reformed CAP
In 2007 an external study on the administrative burden arising from CAP was
published. The study made a cross-country comparison of the existing adminis-
trative costs in 2006 between 5 Member States, namely Denmark, France, Ger-
many, Ireland and Italy.
Despite substantial differences between the selected Member States due to the
national discretion in selecting and implementing a model of SPS119, it was con-
cluded that it were not so much the different implementation models of the CAP
117. NUNEZ FERRER, Jorge, KADITI, Eleni, The EU Added Value of Agricultural Expenditure –
from market to multifunctionality – gathering criticism and success stories of the CAP. Brussels,
CEPS, February 2008, pp. 3-4, 12. Accessed, 10 February 2008, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/dv/200/200802/20080227_cap_study_en.pdf
118. Report from the Commission to the Council on the application of the system of cross-compli-
ance, o.c., p. 4. On the shortcomings identified in the report and their respective proposed solu-
tions, see § 2.5.
119. The 2003 CAP reform gave Member States considerable discretion concerning the implemen-
tation of SPS and its timing. The selected Member States covered the different implementation
options  (Denmark: regional static-hybrid/France: historic with maximum recoupling/Germany:
regional dynamic-hybrid/Ireland: historic without recoupling/Italy: historic with some recoupling)
and had different “maturity” in implementation (the reform was initiated in 2005 in Denmark,
Germany, Ireland and Italy, whilst only in 2006 in France).THE NEW CONTEXT OF THE AGRICULTURAL DEBATE IN EUROPE
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reform that had impact on the administrative costs of farmers, but a set of four
other factors.
Firstly, regarding the transposition of CAP regulations, there is a great disparity
between the Member States in the national legal set-up. To transpose four Reg-
ulations, between 1 (Ireland) and 13 (Italy) legal acts were needed. The number
of information obligations farmers had to fulfil ranged between 21 (Ireland) and
107 (Italy). The administrative forms used and the amount of details requested
differed among countries as well. Pre-printed forms (Denmark and Ireland),
based on previous information, could reduce administrative burden.
Secondly, the involvement of the public administration can be very different. For
instance in Italy, there is a comprehensive state-funded service at the disposal of
the mostly small-scale farmers. In other countries, similar services are conducted
by private companies, and thus at a higher cost for the farmer. The adequate use
of technical means, notably on line services, can reduce the farmer’s administra-
tive costs substantially.
Thirdly, business cultures differ. The outsourcing of administrative work is
widespread in Denmark and, to a lesser extent, in Ireland. In France and Italy,
farmers were reported to do the administrative work themselves.
Fourthly, there are structural differences between farms. A low average farm size
(Italy) is reflected in less diversity in production and thus a relatively lower cost
level than countries with predominantly large farms. Besides, some farmers are
affected by regional differences if they hold land in different administrative
regions (France and Germany)120.
The study also showed that the system of cross-compliance only takes a minimal
share in the total administrative costs of farmers, ranging between 0.3% in Italy
and 4.3% in Denmark121.
3.5. Decoupling
Although it was central principle of the 2003 reform, the implementation shows
that decoupling was not wholeheartedly adopted. A large majority of Member
States has made use of one or more of the options left in the reforms to retain
120. Study to assess the administrative burden on farms arising from the CAP, European Commis-
sion, Directorat-General for Agriculture and Rural Development, October 2007, pp. 5-12.
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some coupled support. Only Ireland, Luxemburg, Malta and the United King-
dom have introduced decoupling without at the same time retaining some sort
of coupled support122.
An impact study on decoupling in 11 EU regions123 compared the consequences
of the 2003 reforms with a hypothetical continuation of the Agenda 2000
reforms. Despite the heterogeneity between the regions studied and the fact that
policy measures were directed at individual farmer level, the study was capable
to draw some general conclusions on a regional level.
Decoupling had a double effect on the structural changes under way following
the Agenda 2000 reform. The decline in number of farms was less strong in all
regions under decoupling as it would have been under Agenda 2000. The main
reason is that decoupled payments offer farmers additional income opportuni-
ties which were previously not there, for example through maintaining GAEC.
Especially farms with grassland benefited from this and remained in the sector.
On the other hand, another structural change, the decline in cattle husbandry,
was effected positively by decoupling. Ruminant production declined stronger
in all regions under decoupling. Even where partial decoupling was applied, the
coupled payments only had a limited influence on the declining trend124. The
study also found that decoupling had a positive effect on farm income. The
growth in farm income was stronger under decoupling than it would be under
the Agenda 2000 reform125.
Finally, the rental prices of both arable land and grassland increased under a
decoupling policy. The rationale for this is that decoupling redistributed cattle
payments from cattle to arable land, and in case of grassland, that it came eligi-
ble for payments on condition of maintaining GAEC, whereas previous is was
not126.
122. Overview of the Implementation of Direct Payments under the CAP in Member States, o.c.
123. Brittany (France), Saxony and Hohenlohe (Germany), Southeast (United Kingdom),
Jönköping and Västerbotten (Sweden), Colli Esini and Piana di Sibari (Italy),Vysocina (Czech
Republic), Nitra (Slovak Republic) and Siauliai (Lithuania).
124. SAHRBACHER, Christoph, SCHNICKE, Hauke, KELLERMANN, Konrad, HAPPE, Kath-
rin, BRADY, Mark, Impacts of Decoupling policies in selected regions of Europe. March 2007, pp.
34-37. Accessed, 6 December 2007, http://www.sli.lu.se/IDEMA/WPs/IDEMA%20deliverable
_23.pdf
125. Ibid., p. 38-40.
126. Ibid., pp. 40-44.29
4. The New External Constraints 
on the Cap
The external context of the CAP has changed quite a lot during the last years.
This explains why the debate about the CAP is fundamentally different from the
previous period. Firstly, agricultural prices have been rising against a secular
trend. Secondly, the growing thirst for energy sources offer new opportunities
for agricultural production, especially biofuels. Thirdly, though progressing very
slowly, the WTO negotiations of the Doha Development Round should impose
new constraints to the EU.
This new situation has been strongly emphasized during the year 2007. In a time
span of less than a month, the Commission made three important announce-
ments. Firstly, the Agricultural Council adopted the Commission’s proposal to
abolish compulsory set-aside for the autumn of 2007 and spring of 2008 sow-
ings in response to the tightening market of cereals127. Introduced in 1988 and
made compulsory in the 1992 reforms, market forces at least temporarily ended
the obligatory set-aside arrangements. Secondly, a proposed suspension of
import duties on cereals was approved by the Agricultural Council128. Again,
the motive for this decision was the price level of cereals on the international
markets. Thirdly, the Management Committee for Direct Payments adopted the
Commission’s proposal to reduce the aid per hectare for energy crops because
the applications had exceeded the maximum eligible area of 2 million hec-
tares129. Since the introduction of the support scheme for energy crops in 2003,
applications exceeded the eligible area for the first time in 2007.
4.1. The rise of world agricultural prices
Since 2006, food prices have been rising on a worldwide scale. There have been
reports of higher than average food price inflation on a regular basis in 2007.
Britain’s Bank of England stated that between March 2006 and March 2007 the
annual food inflation rate reached 6%, almost a six-year high130. The US Labor
Department reported an annual food inflation of 4.2%, twice the rate of overall
127. Regulation 1107/2007. (OJ 2007 L253/1)
128. Regulation 1202/2007. (OJ 2007 L271/7)
129. Regulation 1413/2007. (OJ 2007 L314/6)
130. Inflation Report August 2007, Bank of England, 8 August 2007. Accessed, 16 October 2007,
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/inflationreport/ir07aug.pdfTHE NEW CONTEXT OF THE AGRICULTURAL DEBATE IN EUROPE
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inflation131. In the euro-zone the difference remained more modest: 2.3% food
inflation against 2.1% overall inflation between September 2006 and 2007132.
One of the main causes for this food price inflation is the rise of prices of agri-
cultural raw materials. For instance in the US, some basic agricultural commod-
ities have known serious price elevations in 2007: around 90% for wheat, 40%
for soybeans, 35% for eggs and 18% for milk. Because of the strong global rise
in agricultural commodities, a new term was made to describe it: agflation133.
One could remember that agricultural markets have always been marked by
consecutive periods of high and low prices. Real prices have risen in the periods
of 1900-1918, 1933-1948, and 1973-1980, 2000-2008, even if the long-term
remained downward134. For some, the difference of the current cycle is that
virtually all agricultural commodities are affected by rising prices at the same
time, so market correction as a result of farmers changing to more profitable
crops is less likely135. According to the FAO/OECD 2008 Agricultural Outlook,
“prices will gradually come down… but there is strong reason to believe that
there are now also permanent factors underpinning prices that will work to keep
them both at higher average levels than in the past and reduce the long-term
decline in real terms”.
Several specific reasons can be pointed out for this food price inflation. Some of
them are certainly transitory. The 2008 Agricultural Oulook of the Organisa-
tion for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) and the Food and
Agricultural Organisation (FAO) refers to both temporary and structural rea-
sons. Weather related supply shortfalls (e.g. in Australia and Ukraine) and low
stocks are seen as temporary of nature. The structural changes identified are the
increased feedstock demand for biofuels production and growing prosperity in
emerging economies such as China and India, which leads in turn to a growing
demand for agricultural raw materials. Another important aspect is the high
level of energy prices, which affects production and transportation costs and
trickles down in consumer prices136.
131. Bureau of Labor Statistics, News, USDL-07-1400, 19 September 2007. Accessed, 16 October
2007, http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/cpi.pdf
132. Eurostat, Euro-indicators, Newsrelease 138/2007, 16 October 2007. Accessed, 16 October
2007, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/pls/portal/docs/PAGE/PGP_PRD_CAT_PREREL/
PGE_CAT_PREREL_YEAR_2007/PGE_CAT_PREREL_YEAR_2007_MONTH_10/2-16102007-
EN-AP.PDF
133. The Agonies of Agflation, The Economist, 25 August 2007.
134. See MAZOYER, Paul et ROUDART, Laurence, L’Histoire des agricultures du monde – du
néolithique à la crise contemporaine, Paris: Points, 2002.
135. An Expensive Dinner, The Economist, 3 November 2007.
136. Agricultural Outlook 2008-2017, OECD-FAO. pp. 10-15, 28 May 2008. Accessed 03 June
2008, http://www.fao.org/es/esc/common/ecg/550/en/AgOut2017E.pdfTHE NEW CONTEXT OF THE AGRICULTURAL DEBATE IN EUROPE
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4.2. The increasing demand for biofuels
Rising petroleum prices, concerns about energy supply security and the debate
concerning global warming and reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions have
given an enormous boost to the production of biofuels. Biofuels are by some
portrayed as the ultimate solution for soaring energy prices, obtaining larger
energy security and reducing GHG emissions. Governments have set benchmark
goals and support biofuels production and introduction through tax incentives
or subsidy programmes. As indicated above, the steep ascent of biofuels is
putting pressure on the price level of agricultural commodities. In 2007, the
OECD and FAO noted in their co-authored Agricultural Outlook that, although
not new, “the increased demand for agricultural products in the form of bioen-
ergy feedstocks… constituted an important change from previous market situa-
tions”137 that will “evoke a debate about the ‘food versus fuel’ issue”138. The
central issue in the ‘food versus fuel’ debate is whether it is wise to burden agri-
culture with our energy supply as well, because the consequent rising price levels
of agricultural commodities pose both an opportunity and a threat. On the one
hand, farmers in developed as well in developing as countries can benefit from
higher market prices for their products. On the other hand, food price inflation
could have a negative impact on net food importing countries. There remain
also serious questions about the production efficiency and sustainability of bio-
fuels.
4.2.1. The need of a definition
Biofuels are an aggregate for fuels derived from biomass, mainly of agricultural
origin. The term commonly refers to liquid transportation fuels. The most fre-
quent are (bio)ethanol (ethyl alchohol) and biodiesel (fatty-acid methyl ester).
Ethanol can be derived from sugarcane, sugar beet, corn (maize), wheat and
starchy cereals such as barley, sorghum and rye. The lion’s share of the world’s
ethanol production is situated in Brazil and the US. Biodiesel is produced from
oilseeds crops, namely soybean, sunflower seeds, rapeseed and palm oil. The EU
is the largest producer of biodiesel in the world139.
A distinction is made between first and second generation biofuels. Biodiesel
and ethanol derived from the crops as described above are first generation bio-
fuels. The basic material for first generation biofuels are the oil, sugar or starchy
137. Ibid., pp. 20-21.
138. Ibid., p. 10.
139. Communication from the Commission: An EU Strategy for Biofuels, European Commission,
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content of the specific crops, whereas cellulose is the basic product in second
generation biofuels. This provides for far more possible biomass feedstocks,
since cellulose is found a wider range of biomass sources. In specific, waste of
food crops, switchgrass, willows and jatropha have high potential, because
these sources of feedstock do not necessarily conflict with food production140.
However, technological breakthroughs are needed to improve the cost effective-
ness of second generation biofuels. In the context of technological evolution, the
issue of genetical modification of crops remains a point of discussion. Genetic
engineering or biotechnology is put forward as an optimum way of upgrading
crops yields while at the same time reducing production costs. Therefore, it
promises both economic and environmental advantages. However, biotechnol-
ogy remains controversial and constrained by regulation and bans. Irrespective
of the political or scientific motivation for these bans, development of biotech-
nology is hampered by it141.
4.2.2. Efficiency
The efficiency of biofuels can be expressed in two ways: (1) via a traditional
economic cost/benefit calculation or (2) by estimating the potential for reduc-
tion in GHG emission.
Cost benefit calculation: In 2006, the Commission stated that the production of
biofuels, using the most modern first generation technologies, would economi-
cally break even if the price per barrel would reach €60 for biodiesel and €90
for bioethanol142. Recalculated in the equivalent dollar price at the time of the
publication143, this means $71.6 per barrel of biodiesel and $107.4 per barrel of
bioethanol. The OECD stated in 2007 regarding competitiveness of biofuels
without massive government intervention, that only Brazil’s ethanol production
from sugar cane is competitive with minimum oil prices of $ 70 US per barrel144.
140. Biofuels for Transport: An international Perspective, International Energy Agency, Paris, April
2004, pp. 37-39. Accessed, 18 October 2007, http://www.iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2004/
biofuels2004.pdf
141. RAJAGOPAL, Deepak, ZILBERMAN, David, Review of Environmental, Economic and Pol-
icy Aspects of Biofuels. The World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper 4341, September 2007, p.
71. Accessed, 23 October 2007, http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContent-
Server/IW3P/IB/2007/09/04/000158349_20070904162607/Rendered/PDF/wps4341.pdf
142. Communication from the Commission: An EU Strategy for Biofuels, o.c., p. 5.
143. On 8 Februari 2006, €1 was trading for $1.1934 US. See: http://fx.sauder.ubc.ca/
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Presently, many governmental policies aim at making the production and use of
biofuels financially attractive. They use a wide range of policy tools, such as
excise tax credits, renewable fuel standards and mandatory blending, agricul-
tural subsidies, support for R&D, vehicle subsidies, loans and loan grants, etc.
This web of policy instruments is aimed at specific target groups in the produc-
tion process, covering the entire production process from farmers over industrial
producers to the consumer145. It is questionable whether this approach is cost
effective at the moment. Nonetheless, there are two basic rationales for massive
public investments in the energy sector, a political and moral conviction to
change our use of energy and the infant industry argument, since it is very
expensive to invest in R&D and commercialisation of innovative energy which
will not pay off as long as there are abundant cheap alternatives146.
Environmental calculation: The efficiency in terms of reducing GHG emissions
depends on numerous variables: agricultural practices (e.g. use of fertilizers),
choice of feedstocks (energy value), the land use changes (e.g. clearing rain forest
for palm plantations), the refining and conversion method, the proximity to
feedstocks, etc. Due to this complexity, a full ‘well-to-wheel’ analysis of every
type of biofuel is as difficult as desirable in order to clarify the potential for
reduction of GHG emission. In general, however, second generation biofuels are
produced more efficiently than first generation biofuels147. Only in 2004, the
International Energy Agency (IEA) found that ethanol from sugarcane and from
cellolusic feedstocks had the highest estimated GHG emission reduction (some
70 to 90%). The biofuels promoted massively in the EU and US were deemed
less potential: ethanol from grain (20 to 40%), ethanol from sugar beet (50%)
and biodiesel from rapeseed (40 to 60%) score low to medium148. More recent
American research confirmed the high potential of second generation cellulosic
feedstocks (91%), the moderate potential for biodiesel (68%) and ethanol from
sugar (56%) and the low potential for ethanol from grain (22%)149.
4.2.3. Potential
Studies concerning future global energy demand all project a rising demand for
energy. On a global level, there would be an increase in energy demand of over
145. RAJAGOPAL, Deepak, ZILBERMAN, David, o.c., pp. 59-67.
146. EIKELAND, Per Ove, Biofuels: the New Oil for the Petroleum Industry? The Fridtjof Nansen
Institute, January 2006, pp. 13-14. Accessed, 27 October 2007, http://www.fni.no/doc&pdf/FNI-
R1505.pdf
147. Ibid., p. 17
148. Biofuels for Transport: An international Perspective, o.c., pp. 52-64.
149. Greenhouse Gas Impacts of Expanded Renewable and Alternative Fuels Use, US Environmen-
tal Protection Agency, April 2007. Accessed, 7 November 2007, http://www.epa.gov/otaq/renewa-
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50% by 2030150. Although the largest part of this growth will be attributable to
developing countries, rising demand is also projected in developed countries. In
the US, energy consumption is expected to grow annually 1.1% between 2005
and 2030151. During the same period European energy demand is expected to
continue to grow with an annual rate of 0.6%152.
With respect to biofuels, much attention is devoted to the potential introduction
in the road transportation sector. First generation biofuels as biodiesel and eth-
anol can be introduced quite easily in this market without high costs. Road
transportation constitutes one of the main sources of GHG emissions and is still
expanding. Transportation consumes 30% of the global energy, 99% of which
is supplied by petroleum. In the EU, road transportation accounts for over 30%
of the total energy consumption153 and is responsible for an estimated 21% of
all GHG emissions154. Research estimates that 90% of Europe’s increase of CO2
emissions between 1990 (the reference year of the Kyoto Protocol) and 2010
will be attributable to transport155. Unsurprisingly, major attention and effort is
given to the potential benefits biofuels can bring in this sector.
According to the IEA’s World Energy Outlook 2006, biofuels accounted for
roughly 1% of the total road transport fuel consumption in 2006156. In the EU,
the total market share of biofuels in road transportation reached 1% in 2005157,
while in the US about 3% was reached158.
Projections concerning the capacity to expand biofuels production vary substan-
tially. Interestingly, European sources have generally presented a positive view
150. World Energy Outlook 2005, Paris, International Energy Agency, 2005, p. 79
151. Annual Energy Outlook 2007 with Projections to 2030, Washington DC, US Department of
Energy, p. 72, February 2007. Accessed, 7 November 2007, http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/aeo/pdf/
0383(2007).pdf
152. European Energy and Transport Scenarios on Key Drivers, European Commission p. 36, Sep-
tember 2004. Accessed, 6 November 2007, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/energy_transport/figures/sce-
narios/doc/2005_flyer_scenarios_on_key_drivers.pdf
153. Biofuels in the European Union. A Vision for 2030 and Beyond, European Commission,
2006, p. 3. Accessed, 19 October 2007, http://ec.europa.eu/research/energy/pdf/biofuels_vision_
2030_en.pdf
154. Fact Sheet: Biofuels in the EU: an Agricultural Perspective, European Commission, p. 5, 18
December 2006. Accessed, 16 October 2007, http://bookshop.europa.eu/eubookshop/FileCache/
PUBPDF/KF7606341ENC/KF7606341ENC_002.pdf
155. Biofuels in the European Union. A Vision for 2030 and Beyond, o.c., p. 3.
156. World Energy Outlook 2006, Paris, International Energy Agency, 2006, p. 387.
157. Biofuels Progress Report. Report on the Progress made in the use of biofuels and other renew-
able fuels in the Member States of the European Union, European Commission, p. 6, 10 January
2007. COM(2006)845
158. Biofuels in the U.S. Transportation Sector, Washington DC, US Department of Energy, Feb-
ruary 2007. Accessed, 16 November 2007, http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/analysispaper/bio-
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of an increasing use of biofuels159. On the other side, international sources have
generally developed a more cautious analysis, linking the impact of biofuels on
food prices or on the environment160.
4.2.4. Consequences
The new interaction between the agricultural and energy markets is a complex
one. On both sides, substitutability is only partial. Return on investment can be
evaluated on very different time frames. The availability of commodities is not the
same for both markets161. Nonetheless, a massive shift towards the production
and use of biofuels carries the potential of introducing consequences which will
159. The European Environmental Agency issued in 2006 a study which concluded that significant
amounts of biomass were technically available in Europe to support ambitious renewable energy
targets, even if strict environmental constraints were applied (How much bioenergy can Europe
produce without harming the environment?, European Environmental Agency, Copenhagen, 2006,
p. 6. Accessed, 18 October 2007). A study by the Biofuels Research Advisory Council for the Euro-
pean Commission continues on that premise and states that it is possible to provide up to 25% of
Europe’s transportation energy needs with biofuels by 2030, in contrast to the 0.7% in 2004.
According to the study, between 4 and 18% of the total agricultural land in the EU would be
needed to produce the needed feedstocks for the aims set in the 2003 Biofuels Directive. It recog-
nises the ambitious nature of this goal, but claims it is achievable if domestic production, imports
and R&D are intensified (Biofuels in the European Union. A Vision for 2030 and Beyond, o.c., pp.
3, 30-31).
160. More critical reports were published by several international bodies. The United Nations
Energy Division warned in 2007 that there exists considerable risk of increased CO2 emissions by
using biofuels in the transportation sector.  The potential benefits of biofuels threaten to be
destroyed in the production process of the biofuels. The choice of feedstocks, the land use changes,
the agricultural practice and the actual conversion into biofuels risk to erase the gains in CO2 emis-
sion by the use of biofuels. The report concludes that it would be more appropriate to use biofuels
for combined heat and power production, where they would replace coal-fired production, which
would leave a greater margin for GHG emission reductions ( Sustainable Bioenergy: A Framework
for Decision Makers, United Nations Energy, May 2007, pp. 48-49. Accessed, 18 October 2007,
http://esa.un.org/un-energy/pdf/susdev.Biofuels.FAO.pdf ). A 2007 study of the OECD found that
it is technically possible to produce up to 11% of total global demand for fuel in the transportation
sector by 2050. This statement is accompanied by a clear-cut warning that such an expansion of
biofuels production would have serious consequences on the wider economy and put high pressure
on the environment and biodiversity (DOORNBOSCH, Richard, o.c., p. 4).
The World Bank’s World Development Report 2008, which for the first time in 25 years focussed
on the potential role of agriculture in poverty reduction, is also very cautious on the topic of biofu-
els. It concludes that agriculture faces large and unpredictable uncertainties due to changing con-
sumer demands and new uses. Warnings are issued on the social effect of massive crop cultivation
for biofuels, because many of the world’s poor, both rural and urban, are net food buyers and ben-
efit from low world food prices (World Development Report 2008: Agriculture for Development.
The World Bank, Washington DC, 19 October 2007, pp.70-71). A similar message was given by
Jean Ziegler, a UN expert on the right to food. He even called using food crops for energy a ‘crime
against humanity’ and demanded a 5-year moratorium on biofuels to allow scientific progress to
mitigate the consequences for the poor (Un Expert calls using food crops for fuel ‘crime against
humanity’, International Herald Tribune, 26 October 2007).
161. See SCHMIDHUBER, Josef, Impact of an increased biomass use on agricultural markets,
prices, and food security: A longer-term perspective, in N. CHAMBON coord., What future frame-
work for agriculture after 2013?, Paris: Notre Europe, 2008, pp. 60-99.THE NEW CONTEXT OF THE AGRICULTURAL DEBATE IN EUROPE
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affect the world as a whole. Those consequences can be both positive and nega-
tive, in the short and in the long term, in developed and in developing countries.
Energy security can be enhanced through diversification. Oil-importing coun-
tries can reduce the dependence on foreign sources of energy and secure a part
of its energy needs through domestic production. Prices of petroleum and natu-
ral gas are under pressure because of the fact that they are finite resources,
exploited in some politically unstable parts of the world162.
Global warming can be mitigated and GHG emissions reduced. Traditional
energy production, based on fossil fuels such as petroleum, coal and natural gas,
contributes to the problem of global warming. Combustion of fossil fuels causes
GHG emissions in the atmosphere, specifically CO2, which have been stockpiled
for centuries beneath the surface of the earth. Biofuels have the potential to
reduce the emission of GHG, since they don’t introduce any new GHG into the
atmosphere. Biomass absorbes quantities of CO2 during its lifetime, which are
emitted again (partially) when biomass is used to produce energy163.
Poverty can be reduced through an economic revival of agriculture in developing
countries. The rising price levels of food commodities will benefit agriculture in
developing countries. Many developing countries, who are now net-importers
of food164, will get the opportunity to produce at competitive levels on world
markets. Offsetting agricultural commodities at a higher price will result in
higher incomes for millions of people involved in agriculture and will provoke
new investments, which in turn will provide jobs to millions of people165.
On the other hand, food price inflation can aggravate poverty as well. The surge
of prices of basic agricultural commodities such as corn, wheat, soybean or rice
to decade highs will have the heaviest impact on the world’s poor. Higher agri-
cultural commodity prices pressure the price level of food and feed (which indi-
rectly pressures food price, for instance for meat). As they spend large portions
of their household budget on food (over 50%166), a limited increase in prices
162. HAZELL, Peter, PACHAURI, R.K., Bioenergy and Agriculture: Promises and Challenges,
Overview. International Food Policy Research Institute 2020 Focus No. 14, December 2006.
163. KNUDSEN, Odin, Bioenergy and Agriculture: Promises and Challenges, Potential for Carbon
Payments for Bioenergy. International Food Policy Research Institute 2020 Focus No. 14, Decem-
ber 2006.
164. DIOUF, Jacques, SEVERINO, Jean-Michel, Feeding Africa, International Herald Tribune, 19
October 2007.
165. FERREIRA SIMOES, Antonio José, Biofuels will help fight Hunger, International Herald
Tribune, 6 August 2007.
166. UNDP Annual Report 2007. Making Globalization Work for All, United Nations Develop-
ment Programme, June 2007, P. 2. Accessed, 15 October 2007, http://www.undp.org/publications/
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could seriously hit the world’s poorest people167. In comparison, the weight of
food in the consumer price index in the EU is only 13.9%168. This could even
result in political instability in low and middle income countries and in term
affect global economic progress169.
Environmental sustainability and biodiversity could be threatened by biofuels.
A large scale turnover towards energy crops contains risks for long-term envi-
ronmental sustainability. Research showed that large-scale drainage of peat-
lands and forest clearings for palm oil in South-East Asia are a significant source
of global CO2 emissions. Tropical peatlands contain large quantities of CO2,
which is released by draining it. Additional CO2 emissions are caused by burn-
ing large areas in order to facilitate agricultural plantations170. Palm oil, which
is mostly used in food products, becomes increasingly planted for biofuels. In
Indonesia, oil palm plantations are expected to triple in size to 16.5 million
hectares by 2020171, whilst the county found itself already third on the global
CO2 emissions ranking in 2006 specifically due to peatland degradation172.
Besides, global environmental sustainability and biodiversity are also pressured
by monocropping, intensive water usage, land degradation and pollution by fer-
tilizers173. The use of genetically modified organisms for second generation bio-
fuels is a potential liability.
Finally, social disruption could also be a consequence. In general, large-scale
biofuel industry has a competitive advantage over small farmers because of the
economies of scale. Especially in developing countries, where social protection
is less guaranteed, this could have devastating social effects. There have already
167. RUNGE, C. Ford, SENAUER, Benjamin, How Biofuels Could Starve the Poor, In: Foreign
Affairs, May/June 2007.
168. Prospects for Agricultural Markets and Income in the European Union 2007-2014, Euorpean
Commission, July 2007, p. 18. Accessed, 26 November 2007, http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/publi/
caprep/prospects2007a/fullrep.pdf
169. BROWN, Lester, Biofuels Blunder: Massive Diversion of U.S. Grain to Fuel Cars is Raising
World Food Prices, Risking Political Instability. Briefing before U.S. Senate Committee on Environ-
ment and Public Works,
13 June 2007. Accessed, 22 October 2007, http://www.earth-policy.org/Transcripts/
SenateEPW07.htm
170. HOOIJER, Aljosja, SILVIUS, Marcel, WÖSTEN, Henk, PAGE, Susan, Peat-CO2. Assessment
of CO2 emissions from drained peatlands in SE Asia, Delft Hydraulics Report Q3943 (2006), pp.
1, 12, 7 December 2006. Accessed, 6 November 2007, http://www.wetlands.org/getfile-
fromdb.aspx?ID=b16d46c5-ea7b-469a-a265-408b59aab5d1
171. The use of palm oil for biofuel and as biomass for energy, Friends of the Earth, August 2006,
p. 3. Accessed, 6 November 2007, http://www.foe.co.uk/resource/briefings/palm_oil_biofuel_ posi-
tion.pdf
172. HOOIJER, Aljosja, SILVIUS, Marcel, WÖSTEN, Henk, PAGE, Susan, o.c., p. 0.
173. DUFEY, Annie, International Trade in Biofuels: Good for Development? And good for Envi-
ronment? International Institute for Environment and Development, 2007. Accessed, 22 October
2007, http://www.iied.org/pubs/pdf/full/11068IIED.pdfTHE NEW CONTEXT OF THE AGRICULTURAL DEBATE IN EUROPE
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been reports of forced expulsions of farmers from their land and degrading and
unhealthy work conditions174. The extra employment created has a predomi-
nantly seasonal character and is expected to diminish due to mechanization of
the cultivation175.
4.3. The perspectives of a new WTO agreement
Finally, though it has been going on since 2001, one must mention the negotia-
tions of the Doha Development Round. A new compromise on agriculture was
presented at the beginning of 2008.
Some elements have been known for a long time, like the interdiction of export
subsidies to be applied to developed countries in 2013 (and developing ones in
2016). The new compromise details some new restrictions to be applied to inter-
nal supports. Basically, they imply the abandonment of the so-called blue box
and the addition of the legal constraints in the green box (id est strengthening
of the decoupling principle). The new text also reduces further the ability of
developed countries (and especially the EU) to impose restrictions on so-called
sensible products. Finally, it would require more market access in the developed
countries.
In the Uruguay agricultural agreement, direct payments under production limit-
ing programmes were exempt from reduction commitments. In the current agri-
cultural draft modalities, this Blue Box support would be reduced by 2.5% com-
pared to the value of production in the base period (1995-2000). The reductions
would apply from the first day of the implementation period. Product-specific
Blue Box support would also be capped at the average value of support provided
to those products during 1995-2000. Should Members exceed their limits for
either product-specific or overall Blue Box support, the entirety of this support
must be included in the calculation of the Current AMS, and thus result in larger
cuts (70% for the EU).
Regarding SPS payments, which are considered Green Box payments that are
not tied to a limit because they are considered to be minimally trade distorting,
174. Biofuels. Implications for the South. Report of Seminar, Brussels, European Parliament, pp. 3-
4, 27 June 2007. Accessed, 6 November 2007, http://www.investmentwatch.org/docs/
agrofuelsseminarEPjune2007.pdf
175. Challenges and Opportunities for Developing Countries in Producing Biofuels. United
Nations Conference On Trade And Development, UNCTAD, p. 21, 27 November 2006.
(UNCTAD/DITC/COM/2006/15) Accessed, 6 November 2007, http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/
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the draft provides two options for updating the base periods used to calculate
the amount of decoupled support. Both options aim to ensure that such updates
do not affect producer expectations or decisions. However, the extent to which
the European decoupled direct payments are compatible with the Green Box is
questioned by some and could by the subject of a future WTO challenge176.
The absence of an agreement covering non agricultural products and services
seems nonetheless to indicate that the conclusion of any global deal remains a
far-fetched perspective. The political context, especially the perspective of a
changing administration in Washington, will certainly not simplify the situation.
Nonetheless, one cannot exclude, on the other side, that the present changing
tides on the international agricultural markets, could precisely facilitate a deal,
at least on this topic.
176. SWINBANK, Alan, TRANTER, Richard, Decoupling EU Farm Support: Does the New Single
Payments Scheme fit within the Green Box? In: The Estey Centre Journal of International Law and
Trade Policy, 2005, 6, 1, pp.57-58. Accessed, 8 April 2008, http://www.esteyjournal.com/j_pdfs/
swinbanktranter6-1.pdf41
5. Conclusion: A New Context requires 
a New Approach
Agriculture has entered a new and uncertain phase. Since 2000, most real prices
have increased. It is however difficult to determine whether this is a normal
cyclical evolution or a fundamental change. Both interpretations can be
defended. On one side, there have already been periods of rising prices during
the XXth century, between 1933 and 1948 for example, or 1973 and 1980177.
On the other side, at least two structural changes can be observed. Firstly, the
rising standard of living in some important developing countries (beginning
with China and India) provokes a substantial increase of demand for agricul-
tural products. Secondly, the rising price of fossil energy sources provokes an
increasing demand for biofuels. Both changes appear as long term ones. In the
sidelines, one must also mention the possibility of new production limits created
by climate warming, though they remain presently difficult to evaluate with pre-
cision.
Those familiar with the traditional setting of the agricultural negotiations of the
EU may have some difficulties to get used to the new agricultural context. Rising
demand, new uses of agricultural products, and rising prices form quite a new
picture. This new picture will require deep adaptations, but it also offers oppor-
tunities. It is from that perspective that the new propositions of the European
Commission (the so-called “health check”) need to be analysed.
Important changes have become possible, but they will require imagination in
various directions. Firstly, agricultural prices have been going down for so long
that it is inherently difficult to adapt to another mind setting (which was, para-
doxically enough, the original mind setting of the Treaty of Rome’s authors in
1957). Secondly, the present situation indicates that nothing is eternal. What
goes up can also go down, and designing a house for both good and bad weather
is sometimes a little bit more complex.
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AgOut2017E.pdf.